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INTRODUCTION
In 1973, after a mili|ary takeover, Uruguayan authorities rapidly began liberalizing their economv's tightly regulated financial system. 1/ By late 1974, domestic residents could hold unrestricted dollar-dominated accounts in the Uruguavan Banking System (UBS), and the Central Bank (BCU) had started to pay interest on required bank reserves. By the end of 1976, directed credit prograus had been largely dismantled and interest rate ceilings had been phased out. 2/ By 1979, reserve requirements and numerous other regulations had been eliminated, leaving the UBS virtually free of government controls.
The Uruguayan financial reforms were accompanied by major macro stabilization programs, and as detailed elsewhere, these policies ultimately combined to generate serious problems. 3/ When a civilian government resumacontrol in March 1985, fiscal deficits, high inflation and unemployment had returned. And, unlike when the military took over, the country was ridden with a large vclume of external debt, an internal debt crisis, and an insolvent banking system. level, it is noted that interest rate ceilings in countries with high inflation may make the real cost of credit highly negative. Thus excess demand for credit emerges, and savings are rationed according to criteria such as firm size, rathet than expected returns. At the macro level, it is argued that because the interest elasticity of private savings is positive, the removal of ceilings will raise private savings rates. This greater volume of financial resources will relax the liquidity constraint on investment, accelerating capital formation and raising growth.
We look for evidence of each of these effects.
The paper contains five major sections. Section 2 briefly reviews the impact of the reforms and other developments on financial asset holdings, and on the availability of liquidity to the private sector. Section 3 asks whether there is any evidence of higher growth during the reform period, and
If so, whether it was accompanied by higher savings and investment. Section 4 builds simple econometric models or aggregate savings and investment which are then tested over the period 1962-83. The models are structured to indicate whether private savings responded to interest rates, and whether low private investment levels in the pre-reform period were directly attributable to excessive financial market regulation. Fection 5 investigates whether the reforms improved the efftciency of financial intermediation and cross-firm credit allocation. Conclusions follow in section 6.
Financial Reforms, Financial Deepening, and Financial Crisis
Before formally modelling thle impact of Uruguay's financial regime on real savings and investment, it is useful to establish how closely the evolution of financial variables followed the pattern prescribed by McKinnon
and Shaw.
In this section we briefly review the shifts in portfolio composition that took place during the 1973-82 reform period. We note that the real magnitude of the financial sector expanded rapidly, increasing the availability of funds to the private sectot. In this sense the benefits of financial liberalization should have been present. But we also note that after 1978, much of the financial sector expansion was induced by exchangerate-based stabilization policies rather than deregulation, per se. We raise some questions as to whether such expansion, being largely speculative in nature, can be expected to facilitate economic growth. Table 1 presents the evidence on financial "deepening," or increases in the real size of the financial sector. Notice that a tremendous increase in the ratio of financial assets (M2) to GDP occv--red (column 1), mainly because of a rise in assets denominated in foreign currency (column 2). The -owth in peso-denominated assets was much s1o-er, reflecting the gradual lifting of the ceilings on peso interest rates and the continued high Argentine deposits accounted for mu-i or the capital inflow in the second phase (table 1, columns 2 and 3). 6/ During the first two years of the tablita period, it was the extremely high peso interest rate yields to foreigners which attracted these deposits. Later, when the political and economic situation became more uncertain in Argentina in 1981-82, the UBS appeared to be a relatively safe deposit for Argentines, especially during the South Atlantic conflict. Finally, after reaching their peak in the middle of 1982, foreign deposits fell back to half their value in the next six months, when fears that the Mexican treatment of dollar deposits might be repeated in
Uruguay.
In addition to tle increase in non-resident deposits, a shift in the currency comp^sicion of portfoli s took place during the tablita period. 7/ As conifidence in the tablita waned, portfolios were rapidly adjusted: the share of dollar deposits in the UBS (which had been falling between 1977 and 1980) started to rise again, even when expressed in pesos (see table 1, col.
2). Banks refused to arbitrage across currencies, hence many of the private sector's peso-denominated lo.ans were renewed in dollars as they matured ( In sum, the pattern of financial asset accumulation was particularly turbulent during the tablita period end should pLJoably be attributed more to macro disequilibrium than to the remova, of financial sector controls per se. This turbulence, and the associated increase in uncertainty, may have inhibited the mechanisms described in the financial liberalization literature from taking hold.
Even in the absence of heightened uncertainty, the benefits from deregulation are not automatic. One reason is that financial deepening does not necessarily imply greater credit availability lor the private sector.
Private banks could invest abroad funds captured in Uruguay, or the government averages in the recession vears that followed the Argentine-led boom. Private sector investment rose, and i; appears that the marginal efficiency of investment also rose. However, this rise in investment was funded by foreign savings --private domestic savings actually declined. To go beyond these stylized outcomes, it is necessary to model more explicitly savings and investment behavior. We take up this task in the following section.
Financial Liberalization, Savings, and Investment
The literature on financial repression stresses that because savings levels are sensiti 4 ' to real interest rates, nominal interest controls cum inflation redice the amount of national income allocated to capital formation.
In the firs" part of this section we test whether the liberalization of is included because the adjustment process may be spread over multiple periods, and foreign savings is included because it may "crowd out" domestic savings by allowing residents to consume more at any given rate of capital accumulation.
Of course, the interest rate is included because savings behavior may be sensitive to real returns.
As a point of departure, we estimate this "traditional" model for The alternative specification performs much better in terms of Durb'n's H. statistic, but worse in terms of overall significance levels. With respect to particular parameters, notice first that Interest rates now play no role whatsoever in explaining savings rates, while real exchange rates exhibit For -his exercise we express private investment over GDP as a function of current and lagged real income growth, current and lagged real
money growth, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate, a dummy for the post-reform period, and lagged investment. We then attempt to identify what:
periods, if any, reflect significant structural shifts.
Before discussing structural shifts in the investment function, it is useful to review the full sample (1962-83) findings. Table 7 preser.ts these under the assumption that current income growth is endogenous (column I), real exchange rates are endogenous (column II), real interest rates are endogenous foreign capital goods are cheap when the real exchange rate is low, and the lower this rate, the more likely that devaluation will eliminate bargains in the near future. But In the pre-reform period, low real exchange rates were typicallv .ssociated with relatively tight import controls, as discussed in section 3 _bove. Hence, the negative correlation disappears when pre-reform years are added to the sample. There is also an increase in the interest rate sensitivity of investment from the pre-to the post-1972 period. This may simply reflect a nonlinearity in this relationship, given that real interest rates reached much higher levels during the later period.
V. Financial Resource Allocation at the M 4 cro Level
For a number of reasons, one would expect that more efficient allocation of financial resources at the micro level would have resulted from the reforms. First, relaxing entry barriers into banking should narrow borrowing-lending interest rate spreads. And second, as mentioned earlier, removing interest rate ceilings should increase the efficiency of investment, as some firms may no longer ba rationed, or at least may be less dependent on self-finance. We shall examine the efficiency of financial interm2diation from both the supply ard demand sides. From the supply side we examine bocrowing-lerding spreads and review the evidence on oligopolistic banking behavior. From the demand side, we attempt to identify'reform-induced changes in the allocation (and terms) of credit across firms with different characteristics.
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We begin by noting that spreads between borrowing and lending rates declined for each of the three most important types of loans issued by the UBS: dollar-denominated loans, preferential peso-denominated loans and nonpreferential peso-denominated loans. This means that savers received a greater frac:ion of the return generated by their wealth, and paid less implicit tax to the government. This reduction in spreads was one hoped-for consequence of financial liberalization and no doubt was linked to the phasing out of reserve requirements. In addition, after 1979, when deposits surged, economies of scale probably contributed to the decline in spreads.
According Further evidence on tne extent of non-competitive pricing behavior in UBS is provided by Spiller and Favaro, who studied commercial banks' loan pricing behavior before and after banking houses were a1llowed to expand. 18/ After the regulato.y change, average price-cost margin; and the variance of interest rates across banks fell, suggesting a change n behavior. This was confirmed by empirical models of the barnking sector that exhibited less oligopolistic interaction among the dominant banks aEter the regulatory change.
Such increases in competition may have squeezed monopoly rents in the financial sector, but the deregulation which made them possible also appears to have facilitated a more than optimal degree of risk taking. Coupled with Ur.guay's macro disturbances, the results were disastrous. At the time of this writing, UBS is in the midst of a major financial crisis, with nonperforming loans estimated at several multiples of net worth. Hence in retrospect, to the extent that excessive deregulation many have facilitated the current crisis, the costs of this crisis must be weighed against the reform-induced benefits we have menticned.
b) The Allocation of Credit by Firm Size
We finally turn to evidence of improved credit allocation from the demand side. We proceed by testing whez.her the differences between large and small manufacturing firms' financial profiles changed appreciably after interest rates were deregulated in late 1976. 19/ Because small firms are characterized by relatively uncertain earnings rates, and because they present aanks with relatively high transactions costs per peso borrowed, these firms are likely to pay higher interest rates in the absence of ceilings. But when interest coatrols are imposed, banks may force small borrowers to compensate for these unatt-active characteristics by redu' ig their leverage and/or lessening their default probability Through som ther mechanism, such as changes in their asset structure.
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If prevalent, such phenomena would have occurred prior to 1977, that is, when interest rates were still regulated and liquidity to the private sector had not yet begun its rapid expansion (table 2) The dummv Ds takes a value of one when t -s, and zero otherwis2. The size -it index X 1 t is the logarithm of the ith firm's total assets in ye<.r t, measured as a deviation from the average over all firms' log assets in the same year.
The error component vi is tfirm specific and Eit is pure noise.
Estimation of (1) allows us to test for regime-related changes in the influence of firm size on tve financial characteristic y, controlling for general shifts in mean y values. Gearing -Debt/Assets; Quick -(short-term aisets less inventories) I observations, and xt is a scaling factor -based on the explanatory variables -which ensures that the variance of ut is constant across observations for properly specified models. When no structural shift occurs, the sum k+J k+j i Cj E E ut follows a random walk, and the series CSQj -E ut increases in I k t -k proportion to j. But if the tth observation behaves according to a model different from the model governing the previous t-1 observations, both series are likely to jump.
Brown, Durbin and Evans derive the distributions of 4 C; and -CSQJ a for correctly specified model-, where a is the standard error from the full regression and S is the associated sum of squared residuals. 1/ We use the methodology they suggest to construct the critical bounds for these series (hereafter -CUSUMs-and "CUSUMSQs"), then construct each series two ways. The first by beginning with the first K years of the sample period and adding additional years consecutively.
The second by beginning with the 'ast K years ot the sample period and adding years moving backward in time.
Results for savings models are presenced in Table Al 
